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Additional gold can be made available either by mining at high cost (approximately $250 per ounce in 1997
dollars) or by mobilizing government stocks at zero cost. Governments own massive above-ground stocks but loan
out only a small percentage of these stocks. Making all government gold available for private uses immediately
through some combination of sales and loans maximizes total welfare from private uses, a consequence of the first
welfare theorem. We simulate a calibrated version of our model to quantify the effects of liquidating government
stocks on alternative dates. If governments sell immediately rather than never, total welfare increases by $340
billion; if they make an unanticipated sale in 20 years, $105 billion of that amount is lost. By depressing prices,
such sales benefit depletion and service users but injure private owners of stocks above and below-ground.
However, the injury to above-ground stock owners is more than offset by the benefits to service users—often the
same individuals. Mine owners would be the principal losers; however, they could be compensated (twice over)
from government sales revenue without any need for tax increases.
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Gold has both private uses and government uses. Private uses can be divided into two categories:
depletion uses which reduce the stock and service uses which do not. For example, gold is depleted
when it is used in dentistry and some industrial processes. Gold yields services when it is held as jewelry,
bars, coins, and medals but remains available for the future. Governments hold gold as a monetary asset,
as a bwar chest,Q and as a strategic material.
Additional gold for any private use can be obtained either from mines or from government stocks. The
cost of extracting gold from the mines is approximately $250 per ounce in 1997 dollars. However, the
resource cost of drawing down government stocks is zero. Governments lend out relatively little of their
massive above-ground stocks. Making these stocks available to the private sector sooner increases
welfare from private uses (net of extraction costs). In addition, governments themselves maximize their
discounted revenues by immediate sales. We assess the size and distribution among market participants
of the increase in welfare that would arise if governments sold their gold early in the horizon (or
equivalently if governments loaned out their gold early in the horizon and sold later).
For simplicity, we focus on policies under which governments sell all their gold outright in some
given year. We show, however, that the same equilibrium and payoffs result from a variety of policies
involving different combinations of government gold sales and government gold loans. A gold loan
involves lending gold today and receiving back the same amount of gold plus a loan fee next year.
Welfare from private uses is maximized when governments make all their gold available immediately
through some combination of sales and loans. Although private agents are indifferent to which
combination is chosen, governments may not be. Under some policies involving lending, governments
continue to own stocks of gold for two hundred years or more, even though they do not possess those
stocks.
Making all government gold available for private uses immediately eliminates two types of
inefficiencies. A production inefficiency occurs whenever a given intertemporal pattern of private uses
can be supplied at lower cost, for example, by beginning to use costless government gold now and
postponing any costly extraction from the mines until government stocks are exhausted (Herfindahl,
1967). A use inefficiency occurs whenever welfare can be raised by altering the intertemporal pattern of
private uses and can arise even if there is no possibility of a production inefficiency as, for example,
when all gold can be obtained at the same constant marginal cost. Since gold has service uses as well as
depletion uses, use inefficiencies can be avoided only if government gold is made available to service
users immediately.1
A simple bthought experimentQ can be used to isolate the production inefficiency. Suppose
governments offered to sell their above-ground stocks to mine owners in exchange for epsilon less than
$250 per ounce (our estimate of the marginal cost of extraction) and title to an equal amount of
underground gold. Since the cost of government gold is slightly less than the cost of mining, mine
owners would fill orders by purchasing above-ground government gold as long as it lasted. Under this
policy, government gold reserves would remain unchanged in magnitude but would increasingly reside1 If gold had only depletion uses like the resource in the classic Hotelling (1931) analysis, use inefficiencies could be avoided
even if governments did not make gold available immediately; it would be sufficient for them to commit now to make their gold
available to private users gradually over time.
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essentially the same as before, they would not alter their pricing. Hence, the welfare of private
participants in the gold market would not change. However, government revenues would change, and
their increase measures the production inefficiency which is eliminated.
To obtain a bmodel-freeQ estimate of the production inefficiency, one needs–in addition to
assumptions about the marginal cost of extraction and the interest rate–a forecast of the future mining
path. Suppose, as a first approximation, that mine owners steadily bought government gold for their
customers at $250 per ounce in the amount of 73 million ounces per year (the mining rate in recent
years), the 1107 million ounces of current government stocks would last for 15 years. If governments
invested the receipts from their sales at a 2.5% annual interest rate, they would earn $232 billion in
present value terms!
In order to obtain additional information that is of importance for policy, we construct a (publicly
available) simulation model.2 We use this model (1) to refine our estimate of the production inefficiency,
(2) to calculate the magnitude of the use inefficiency, and (3) to disaggregate by interest group the gains
and losses which would result if both inefficiencies were simultaneously eliminated by an immediate
sale or a sale at any specified date. Of necessity, our model embodies additional assumptions about
demand parameters, growth rates, market structure, and price expectations.3 Some of the alternative
additional assumptions that we consider significantly affect either the estimated size of the use
inefficiency or conclusions about the price and distribution effects of government gold sales or both.
However, none yield estimates of the production inefficiency that are appreciably different from the
model-free estimate because the forecasted paths for mining in the absence of a government sale are not
appreciably different from the one assumed in making the model-free estimate.
Using our reference set of parameters in our simulation model, we conclude that total welfare, as
measured by discounted economic surplus in 1997 dollars, increases by $340 billion if the sale is
immediate. The refined estimate of the gain from removing the production inefficiency is $247
billion (72.6% of the surplus gain)—an amount only $15 billion (6%) larger than our model-free
estimate.4 We estimate that removing the use inefficiency raises surplus by another $93 billion
(27.4% of the surplus gain). If government sales are delayed 20 years, $105 billion of the $340 billion
is lost.
Gold sales benefit depletion users, service users, and the governments themselves while injuring to a
lesser extent owners of the mines and above-ground stocks. Delaying sales reduces both the gains of the
depletion users and governments and the losses of mine owners.
To the extent that the individuals who enjoy the services of gold jewelry and art also own these items,
it is appropriate to aggregate their gains and losses. In aggregate, service users and owners of the above-
ground stock benefit by $71 billion if there is an immediate sale. They suffer a net loss of $16 billion if
the sale is delayed 20 years.
Mine owners are the only losers if governments sell immediately (assuming that the gains and losses
of service users and above-ground stock owners are aggregated). With an immediate sale, government
revenue is large enough that mine owners can be compensated twice over without raising taxes.2 The web site for the model is at wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~ssalant/gold/.
3 Readers wishing to explore the consequences of alternative input parameters are invited to go to the model web site.
4 This 6% discrepancy arises because the annual mining path predicted by the model exhibits some variation while in
constructing our model-free estimate we assume that mining remains steady at 73 million ounces per year.
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the losses of mine owners fall by virtually the same amount. As a result, government revenue left over
after covering both the loss of the mine owners and the net loss of services users and above-ground stock
owners falls by only 10%.
Our estimates understate the total welfare gains from gold sales for at least two reasons: they leave out
both the gain from delaying the substantial pollution damages caused by gold mining and refining and any
reductions in tax distortions which may arise if additional revenues from gold sales induce tax decreases.5
As seems reasonable, if one country unilaterally sells its gold before other governments can sell or even
announce a sale, that country earns a larger discounted revenue than it does if other governments sell at the
same time or earlier. According to our simulationmodel, theU.S. earns 17%more if itmakes a unilateral sale.
The remainder of this paper comprises five sections. In Section 2, we describe the model and its
competitive equilibrium. In Section 3, we discuss the effects of government gold policies on competitive
equilibrium and the payoffs of market participants. In Section 4, we calibrate the simulation model and
use it to estimate the effects of alternative government gold policies. Section 5 contains the conclusions.2. The model
In this section, we discuss the market participants in our model and describe the unique competitive
equilibrium that results if their price-taking behaviors are consistent.
2.1. The behavior of private market participants
In our model there are four groups of private market participants: depletion users, service users,
above-ground stock owners, and mine owners. Since our objective is to simulate our model, we find a
discrete-time formulation6 convenient. We interpret a period as a year and have extended the finite
horizon far enough that lengthening it further would have negligible effects on the results we report.
2.1.1. Depletion users
In each year, depletion users buy qt units of gold at the price of Pt per unit (measured in background
good or constant bdollarsQ). Their depletion uses reduce the gold stock. The inverse demand function for
depletion users is denoted







z0; P 0; tð Þ ¼l; t ¼ 0; . . . ;T : ð2Þ5 The negative externalities associated with gold mining include mercury, arsenic, and cyanide poisoning and damages caused
by the human wastes of the miners. Descriptions of gold mining in the United States and Brazil by Duncan (1997) and the
World Bank (1991), respectively, indicate that these externalities can be large. Young (2000) cites the existence of these
externalities as one important reason for initiating a national debate about government gold policy in the United States.
6 It is straightforward to recast our analysis in continuous time or as a planning problem.
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decreasing with time, and approaches infinity as the quantity depleted approaches zero. We also require
that the sequence of inverse demand curves is bounded in the sense that P(qt, t)VP(qt) for qt N0 for
some function P(qt). The ordinary demand function for depletion users is the inverse of Eq. (1):
qt ¼ q Pt; tð Þ; depletion demandð Þ: ð3Þ
2.1.2. Service users
In each year, service users borrow At units of gold for one year at a loan fee of Rt per unit (measured
in background good or constant bdollarsQ).7 Service uses do not reduce At, which is referred to as the
service stock.8 The inverse demand function for service users is denoted







z0; R 0; tð Þ ¼l; t ¼ 0; . . . ;T : ð5Þ
The loan fee such users are willing to pay in a given year falls as the size of the stock borrowed
increases, is non-decreasing with time, and approaches infinity as the stock borrowed approaches zero.
The ordinary demand function for service users is the inverse of Eq. (4):
At ¼ A Rt; tð Þ service demandð Þ: ð6Þ
2.1.3. Owners of the above-ground stock





I t RtAt  Pt Atþ1  Atð Þ½ ; subject to A0 ¼ Ā;
where At and Ā are the stock in year t and the exogenous initial stock, respectively. Owners of the above-
ground stock are assumed to hold Ā units initially:
A0 ¼ Ā initial condition for Atð Þ: ð7Þ
Within any year t, first the inherited above-ground stock is loaned out and then mining, depletion, and
sales or purchases by above-ground stock owners occur so that Atþ1  Atf0. Since year T is the last year
of the finite horizon, above-ground stock owners can neither loan out nor sell gold carried forward into
year T+1. As a result, in year T they will sell the gold they have carried forward into that year and will
not buy any gold, so no above-ground stock is carried forward into year T+1:
ATþ1 ¼ 0 terminal condition for Atð Þ: ð8Þ
Therefore, all gold above ground at the start of year T or newly mined during that year is depleted.7 In reality, the loan fee is typically denominated in gold. Our assumption that it is denominated in background good or
constant bdollarsQ simplifies the analysis without affecting the conclusions.
8 Gold from the service stock is assumed to be a perfect substitute for gold from the mines in any use. In our model, we
abstract from the costs of transforming newly mined gold into jewelry, bars, or coins, but in the final section, we discuss
extending our model to allow for such dadjustmentT costs.
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1þi a 0; 1ð Þ denote the market discount factor, where i is the exogenous real interest rate. In
deciding whether to sell off an additional unit in any year t (rather than in the following year), each
owner compares the revenue advantage from selling in the earlier year (Pt IPt+1) to the disadvantage of
selling earlier—the foregone loan fee (or foregone enjoyment) (IRt+1).
Since owners take current and future prices and loan fees as given, optimal behavior insures that the
following conditions hold:
Atþ1 ¼ 0; only if Pt  IPtþ1zIRtþ1;
0bAtþ1bl; only if Pt  IPtþ1 ¼ IRtþ1;
Atþ1 ¼l; only if Pt  IPtþ1VIRtþ1: carry forward conditions for Atð Þ ð9Þ
2.1.4. Mine owners









where ht and H̄ are respectively the amount extracted in year t and the exogenous initial below-ground
reserves. Owners of the below-ground stock are assumed to hold H̄ units of reserves initially:
H0 ¼ H̄ initial condition for Htð Þ: ð10Þ
In any year t, they enter with stock Ht and can reduce their holdings by extracting and selling
hta [0, Ht]. We assume that the cost of extraction (c) is independent of the amount extracted and is
insensitive to the size of reserves. Since year T is the last year of the finite horizon, mine owners
cannot sell what they extract in year T+1.
Therefore, it is not optimal to enter year T+1 with any gold underground as long as there has been a
strictly positive net price (PtcN0) in some prior year:
HTþ1 ¼ 0 exhaustion of mines conditionð Þ: ð11Þ
In deciding whether to extract and sell an additional unit in any year t (rather than in the following
year), each mine owner compares the revenue advantage from selling the unit in the earlier year
(Pt IPt+1) to the disadvantage of extracting in the earlier year (Iic).
Since owners take current and future prices as given, optimal behavior insures that the following
conditions hold:
htN0; htþ1 ¼ 0 only if Pt  IPtþ1zI ic;
htN0; htþ1N0 only if Pt  IPtþ1 ¼ I ic; adjacent year mining conditionsð Þ
ht ¼ 0; htþ1N0 only if Pt  IPtþ1VI ic:
ð12Þ
Notice that in our formulation the revenue advantage from selling a unit in the earlier year (Pt IPt+1)
is the same whether the unit sold comes from above or below-ground.
2.2. Competitive equilibrium
If all privately owned gold is initially underground and no official stocks are ever released, then
the economy must pass through two phases. During each phase, some stocks acquired from the
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mines are exhausted, the next phase begins and the service stock is drawn down to satisfy depletion
demand.
During each phase, the price rises by less than the rate of interest. In the first, or mining, phase, both
mine owners and holders of the above-ground stock could make a gross gain of Pt IPt+1N0 in
discounted terms by selling in year t rather than in year t+1. Each type of agent is indifferent between
reaping this gross gain or not because selling in period t would also involve an offsetting cost. Mine
owners would incur the cost of extraction a year earlier, and above-ground stock holders would forego
the rental income or service flow that they would receive if they waited to sell until t+1. Since each type
of agent has the same gross gain from selling at t instead of t+1 and each type has an offsetting cost of
selling in the earlier period, the offsetting costs must be equal: R(At+1* , t+1)= ic. That is, the above-
ground stock must adjust so that the rental is constant during the mining phase. As a consequence, if the
rental demand curve shifts out over time, the above-ground stock must grow.
In the second phase, there is no mining. The above-ground stock is drawn down, and the rental rate
rises above ic.3. Government policy
In this section we discuss government gold policies which can involve both sales and lending. Sales
could in theory occur before, during, or after the mining phase. Because of its relevance to the current
situation, we focus attention on the case of sales during the mining phase. Then we discuss equivalent
policies involving lending. We end by explaining why selling sooner increases discounted government
revenue.
3.1. A sale during the mining phase
Suppose that governments sell their gold during the mining phase and that the magnitude of the sale is
sufficient that mines suspend operations, inducing a three-phase equilibrium.9 Denote the year of the
government sale of Ḡ as tS=0, . . ., T.
Fig. 1 shows what happens if an unanticipated government sale in year 20 interrupts the first phase of
a two-phase equilibrium. At the time of the sale (tS=20), the price drops, and the first phase of a three-
phase equilibrium begins. The solid line in the five panels of Fig. 1 describes what happens with no
government sale. The dotted lines illustrate what occurs following the sale. The first phase, during which
there is no mining but there is still gold below-ground, runs from year tS=20 to year tB1=40. The
second phase during which there is mining runs from year tB=41 to year tE=56. The third phase during
which there is no more gold below ground and depletion is fed from the service stock runs from year
tE+1=57 to year T=399.9 If government stocks are sufficiently large, there will be no mining in the year of a sale of these stocks. More formally, if
ḠNAtS+1* AtS+q( ftS , tS, tS), tSa0, . . ., tE, where tE is the year in which mining ends in the absence of a sale, then there will be
no mining in year tS. By hypothesis, Ḡ+AtSq( ftS,tS, tS)NAtS+1* , tSa0, . . ., tE. Hence, Ḡ+AtS+htSq( ftS,tS, tS)NAtS+1* , tSa0, . . .,
tE for any htSz0. But the left-hand side is simply AtS+1, so our condition implies that AtS+1NAtS+1* . Under this circumstance,
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Fig. 1. Time paths: sale in year 20 compared to no sale.
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D.W. Henderson et al. / Review of Financial Economics 16 (2007) 235–258 243In year tS=20 the price (top left) drops from about $413 per ounce before the sale to about $293 and
remains below the no sale path thereafter. Depletion (top right) is higher after the sale because the price
is lower. The service stock (middle right) increases sharply in year tS+1=21 because it now includes the
gold the government sold.
During the first phase after a sale in tS=20, the mines (bottom right) are shut down (ht=0). During
this phase the service stock is drawn down to satisfy depletion demand in each year. In years tS+1=21
through tB1=40, the service stock (middle right) carried into the year is greater than At*, so the loan
fee (middle left) is below ic: At NAt*, t= tS+1,. . .,tB1, so the mines (bottom right) are closed (ht =0,
t= tS, . . ., tB1). We represent At* in Fig. 1 (middle right) by the rising solid line and the rising dashed
and dotted continuations of that line.
3.1.1. Equivalent policies involving loans
Instead of selling all their gold at some date tS, governments could achieve identical results by
committing at tS to a loan policy with two features: (1) lend all holdings henceforth and (2) own in every
subsequent year a specified amount never larger than the above-ground private stock would have been in
each year following a government sale at tS.
To verify that the same path of prices and loan fees would prevail under the loan policy, we show that
no excess supply or demand would occur in any year given the price and loan fee paths in the
equilibrium with an immediate sale. Given these paths, loan demand and depletion demand are
unchanged.
First, we verify that this unchanged loan demand is satisfied in every year with the loan policy. With
an immediate sale, loan demand is satisfied in every year because the entire amount (At) is loaned out by
the private sector. With the loan policy, that same amount is loaned out in every year—part by the private
sector and the rest by the governments. Given the price and loan paths, private agents are willing to offer
the necessary path of gold loans because they are indifferent as long as no one carries gold into year
T+1.
Second, we verify that depletion demand is satisfied in every year with the loan policy. With an
immediate sale, depletion demand is satisfied by a combination of gold from the mines and gold from the
decumulation of the above-ground private stock. With the loan policy, since the price path is unchanged,
the optimal path of extraction is the same as with an immediate sale. Moreover, the combined
accumulation (or decumulation) of above-ground stock by governments and the private sector is the same
in every year as with an immediate sale. Hence, depletion demand is satisfied under the loan policy.
As an illustration, we consider a class of loan policies that yield the dotted path in Fig. 1. Under each
policy in this class, the government commits to holding a path of government stocks which lies weakly
above the horizontal axis and weakly below the dotted path of the equilibrium service stock in the
middle right panel of Fig. 1. The remaining above-ground stock is willingly held by the private sector.
We consider three different policies in the class.
If governments wanted to own their existing stocks of gold for as long as possible, they could
announce in year 20 that all government holdings would henceforth be loaned out and that these
holdings would be constant at Ḡ until the dotted line in the middle right panel of Fig. 1 dropped to Ḡ and
would then coincide with that dotted line. Under that policy, no government gold would be sold before
year 370.
Alternatively, if the governments preferred, they could purchase at tS the entire private stock while
committing to (1) loaning out their holdings and (2) adjusting their holdings each year to maintain them
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governments acquire the entire above-ground gold stock and adjust it over time. Until year 370, their
stocks remain larger than the massive amounts they already hold; only after that date would their
reserves fall below current levels.
Finally, a complete sale at tS can be regarded as a third member of this class of equivalent
policies. This particular policy involves a path of government holdings after tS coincident in every
year with the horizontal axis in the middle right panel of Fig. 1. In this case, the governments
have no above-ground stocks to lend out; the private sector makes the stocks available to service
users.
The existence of a class of government policies that yield the same outcomes depends on the
indifference of holders of above-ground stocks. A private holder of an ounce of gold does not care
whether he sells it immediately and lets interest accumulate thereafter or loans it out for a while,
selling it in year T or earlier. The latter strategy yields exactly the same compensation, partly from
loan fees and partly from the capital gain realized when the gold is eventually sold. Once
governments participate in the market, they are likewise indifferent between selling at the outset and
lending. It is this joint indifference which insures that a class of government policies induces the
same equilibrium.
3.2. Selling sooner increases government revenue
In this subsection we use Fig. 2 to provide an intuitively appealing explanation for why selling
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Fig. 2. Government revenue: immediate sale compared to sale in year 20.
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to $275, increases at a rate less than the rate of interest, and reaches $315 in year 20. The equilibrium
price following the sale increases at less than the rate of interest because private owners of the service
stock receive another form of compensation which supplements the modest capital gain: loan fees. If
governments invest their revenue from the sale in year 0, it grows at the real rate of interest and reaches
$451 in year 20 (dot/dash line), a level $136 above the $315 market price then. The $136 difference
reflects the capitalized value of the loan fees that private owners of the above-ground stock would
receive if they loaned out their gold and then sold it for $315 in year 20. Since private owners receive
loan fees, they are indifferent between selling initially or in year 20. However, since governments do not
receive loan fees because they do not lend out the gold they hold, they are much better off if they sell at
the outset and invest the proceeds.
Indeed, $136 per ounce understates the full gain because the price in year 20 would be below
$315 if governments postponed their sale until then. If governments do not sell until year 20 (solid
line) the price is higher during the intervening 20 years and, as a consequence, depletion is smaller.
Therefore, after a sale in year 20, the total stock, including gold both below and above-ground, is
larger than it would be if there were a sale in year 0, and so is the service stock augmented by
gold from the government sale. The equilibrium price at any given date can be written as a
function of these two stocks and must fall if both increase.11 Hence, the larger stocks which result if
the sale is delayed 20 years cause the price following a sale in year 20 to fall to $293, a price $22 lower
than $315. Hence, the full gain (capitalized to year 20) to governments from selling immediately instead
of in year 20 is $158 per ounce ($451–$293) as indicated by the gap between the dot–dash line and the
solid line.12
It is interesting to review the historical record in light of this analysis. During the 1970s, the U.S.
Treasury conducted several auctions of relatively small amounts of gold. We compared the average
prices received at these auctions by capitalizing them all to September 1997 (using the one-month U.S.
Treasury bill rate) and found that the average price at the May 1978 auction was the lowest. The actual
average price at the May 1978 auction was $180 per ounce. Selling at even this price turned out to be
more profitable than leaving gold in government inventories until September 1997. By September 1997
the price of gold had risen to about $310 per ounce. However, this increase did not go even halfway
toward keeping up with inflation as measured by the increase in the U.S. CPI. In order for the gold price
to have remained constant in real terms, the dollar price in September 1997 would have to have risen to
about $451 per ounce. Furthermore, it was possible to do better than keeping up with inflation by
investing in one-month U.S. Treasury bills. Had the $180 amount received from selling an ounce of
gold in May 1978 been continually reinvested in one-month U.S. Treasury bills, by September 1997 it
would have grown to about $709, an amount more than twice the then prevailing price of about $310
per ounce.10 Fig. 2, like Fig. 1, is constructed using the reference set of parameters shown in Table 1.
11 Both rise, for example, if an increase in the above-ground stock more than offsets any decrease in the below-ground stock.
Proof of the claim in the text is available in Henderson, Irons, Salant, and Thomas (1997).
12 It is interesting to note that in this example most (136 /158=86%) of the gain from expediting government sales arises
because of our assumptions that gold has service uses and that governments do not loan out their holdings prior to selling. This
source of gain does not arise in Salant and Henderson (1978) where we abstract from service uses of gold.
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In this section, we calibrate a simulation model consistent with our theoretical specification and use it
to quantify the positive and normative effects of alternative government policies.
4.1. Calibration of the model
We assume that the real interest rate and the constant marginal cost of mining are stationary over time
and that the demands of depletion users and service users have the following functional forms:
qt ¼ acq;tPet ; At ¼ bcA;tR
q
t ð13Þ
where cq,t and cA,t are given by
13
cg;t ¼ 2 ytq; 0bcqb1; cA;t ¼ 2 ctA; 0bcAb1: ð14Þ
Given these functional forms, our model has eleven parameters: T, i, c, Ā, cq, cA, H̄, e, a, q, and b.
For any admissible values of these eleven parameters, there exist unique solution paths for the four
endogenous variables: pt, q, Rt, and At.
14 The parameter values employed in our simulations and some
data used in calibration are displayed in Table 1.
The values for 5 parameters (T, i, Ā, cq, and cA) reported in Panel A are used in all simulations. We
assume a horizon of 400 years (T=399), a horizon sufficiently long that our predictions for the first one
hundred years are unaffected if the horizon is lengthened. Our choice for i (2.5%) is well within the
range of estimates reported in the macroeconomics literature. Our choices for c and Ā are based on data
from the gold market reported in the literature.15 We assume that the demand shift parameters cq,t and
cA,t increase monotonically over time according to the functional forms in Eq. (14). Under this
assumption, model predictions are roughly consistent with two features of the data: constant or rising
depletion during years of rising gold prices and increases in the service stock during the mining phase.
We interpret cq,t and cA,t as population indexes and assume, for simplicity, that they are always equal.
Given the values of cq and cA in panel A, cq,t and cA,t begin at a value of 1 and reach 93.5% of their
asymptotic value of 2 after 50 years.
The values of the remaining 6 parameters (H̄, c, q, e, b, and a) are changed among simulations. As
reported in Panel B, we choose a breference setQ of parameters, indicated by the subscript rs, and make
the simplifying assumption that ers=qrs. We check the sensitivity of our results to changes in H̄ and c
because there is considerable uncertainty about these two key parameters and to the relaxation of the
simplifying assumption that ers=q. H̄rs is among the highest estimates of H̄ available in the literature.
Nonetheless, we consider a value of H̄ that is 25% higher than H̄rs because estimates of the below-
ground stock have been revised upward more frequently than downward in recent years. Technological
change might cause c to fall, but the increased bargaining power of mine workers in South Africa and
other gold producing countries might cause it to rise. We consider a value of c that is 20% lower than crs14 Uniqueness of competitive equilibrium follows from two facts: (1) every competitive equilibrium solves the associated
planning problem and (2) the associated planning problem for our model has a unique solution since inverse demand functions
are downward sloping, and cost functions are assumed to be linear.
15 See Appendix A for a discussion of this and other data choices.








where e N0. It has the properties in Eq. (2); in addition,







Values of parameters and data




Panel B: Parameters Changed Among Simulations
Parameter set Parameters
H̄ c q e b a
Reference set 2292b 250c 0.57 0.57 6.501010 3.36108
H̄N H̄rs 2865
b 250c 0.39 0.39 5.89109 1.20108
c bcrs 2292
b 200c 0.40 0.40 4.381010 1.27108
H̄ N H̄rs, c bcrs 2865
b 200c 0.29 0.29 4.601010 6.73107
q bqrs 2292
b 250c 0.35 1.64 4.351010 1.741011
Panel C: Data on Price and Depletion
P̄=350c q̄=12c per year
Panel D: Data on Government Gold Stocks
Ḡ =1107c U.S. Gold=262c
a Years.
b Millions of troy ounces.
c Dollars per troy ounce.
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the welfare gain from a government sale. For the same reason, we consider a set of parameter values in
which qbqrs=ersbe.
For each alternative set of parameters, the values for four demand parameters (the demand elasticities,
e and q, and the demand constants, a and b) are obtained by calibrating the model. Our method of
calibration involves setting values for some of the endogenous variables and solving for the demand
parameters that are consistent with those values using an iterative technique. In particular, for every trial
pair of the elasticities, we set a so that P̄=P(q̄, 0) and b so that ic=R(Ā, 0), where the values of P̄, q̄, i, c,
and Ā are given in Table 1. The final values for the demand parameters are chosen to satisfy the terminal
condition AT+160.16 Therefore, by design, with each set of parameters our model dpredictsT an initial
price of P0= P̄, initial depletion of q0= q̄, and a mining phase in progress with service stock equal to
A0*= Ā, that is, ic=R(Ā, 0).
4.2. Estimates of the effects of alternative policies
In this subsection we describe simulations of the effects of an unanticipated sale of all government
gold at different points in time under each of the parameter sets displayed in Table 1 and the effects of an
unanticipated immediate sale of only U.S. gold under the reference set.16 In each case, we arrived at the final values chosen for the elasticities e and q starting from several different widely-spaced
initial values.
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We begin by considering the effects of selling all government gold, Ḡ in Panel D of Table 1, in year tS,
tS=0, . . ., T under the reference set of parameters. Since the sale of government gold is unanticipated, the
paths of all the variables before tS are the same as they would be if government gold were withheld forever.
The five panels of Fig. 3 show the effects on the gold market of two extreme government gold
policies, no sale of any government gold (the solid lines) and an immediate sale of all government gold
(the dotted lines). With an immediate sale, the price (top left) drops at once from $350 to about $275 per
ounce and remains below the no sale path thereafter; as a result, depletion uses (top right) are higher in
every year. With an immediate sale, the loan fee (middle left) is lower initially and in most years, and is
never higher; the service stock (middle right) is higher initially and in most years, and is never lower.
With no sale, mining (bottom right) occurs initially and declines slowly until year 29 when the mines are
exhausted. In contrast, with an immediate sale, the mines shut down at once, reopen again in year 11 and
are exhausted in year 54. With an immediate sale, cumulative depletion exceeds the sum of the initial
service stock and the below-ground stock for the first time in year 368, so under the loan policy that is
equivalent to an immediate sale and involves postponing government sales for as long as possible, the
first sale of government gold takes place in that year.
4.2.2. Two breakdowns of the welfare gain
We provide two breakdowns of the estimated gain in total welfare from selling government gold
earlier. The first breakdown is by type of market participant. The gain in total welfare is obtained by
adding up the gains for each type of market participant. For depletion users and service users, the gains
in a given year are the increases in the areas under their demand curves (net of any expenses required to
purchase or rent the quantity chosen) while the total gains are the discounted sums of those increases in
areas. For the government, service stock owners, and mine owners, the gains in a given year are the
increases in revenues in that year (net of any cost of generating those revenues), while the total gains are
the discounted sums of those increases in net revenues.
The second breakdown is by type of inefficiency reduced. We decompose the total welfare gain from
a government sale in year tS into two components, the gain arising from removing the production
inefficiency and the gain arising from removing the use inefficiency. To isolate the former, we compute
the largest reduction in discounted costs which a planner could achieve while replicating the depletion
and above-ground stock paths of the bno saleQ equilibrium if beginning in year tS he could replace gold
taken from below ground at high cost with gold taken from government vaults at no cost. The gain from
removing the use inefficiency is then calculated as the difference between the total welfare gain from the
sale at tS and the amount attributed to the production inefficiency.
The upper left and right panels of Table 2 show the estimated effects on welfare from private uses
for three comparisons of alternative government selling policies under the reference set of parameters.
The first columns show how welfare changes with an immediate sale of all government gold versus no
sale. Total welfare increases by $340 billion. The largest share of the increase in welfare (87.5%) takes
the form of government revenue in the first instance. Depletion users and service users gain, but
private above-ground stock owners and mine owners lose. The breakdown by type of inefficiency
reduced shows that 72.6% of the total welfare gain comes from eliminating the production
inefficiency.
The second columns show how welfare changes with a sale of all gold in year 20 versus no sale. The
gain from reducing the production inefficiency is smaller but represents about the same share (72.1%) of
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Fig. 3. Time paths: immediate sale compared to no sale.
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(billions of 1997 dollars)
Reference Case
(% of total)
Total 340 234 105 100 100 100
Government Revenue 297 193 104 87.5 82.5 98.7
Depletion Users 104 88 17 30.7 37.3 15.8
Service Users 260 272 12 76.6 116.1 11.3
Stock Owners 189 288 99 55.5 122.8 94.1
Mine Owners 133 30 102 39.2 13.2 97.3
Production Inefficiency 247 169 78 72.6 72.1 73.8
Use Inefficiencies 93 65 27 27.4 27.9 26.2
H̄ NReference H̄
(% change from reference case)
q bReference
q (% change from reference case)
Total 1.6 2.1 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.7
Government Revenue 2.6 3.3 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.3
Depletion Users 10.8 15.3 0.8 10.9 14.6 2.6
Service Users 9.5 14.6 1.9 11.3 22.1 12.7
Stock Owners 6.3 12.2 6.8 2.3 6.9 8.1
Mine Owners 13.0 16.5 5.1 2.1 0.5 7.7
Production Inefficiency 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Use Inefficiencies 1.6 2.1 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.7
c bReference
c (% change from reference case)
H̄ NRef H̄, c bRef
c (% change from reference case)
Total 5.9 0.0 19.2 7.7 2.3 19.7
Government Revenue 10.3 6.4 18.9 13.0 9.9 19.8
Depletion Users 21.5 27.6 7.9 39.9 53.8 9.0
Service Users 27.9 42.3 4.1 36.1 54.8 5.3
Stock Owners 24.5 56.5 46.6 30.9 69.1 54.0
Mine Owners 20.5 7.0 50.7 39.9 31.9 57.5
Production Inefficiency 14.5 14.4 14.8 14.5 14.4 14.7
Use Inefficiencies 8.6 14.4 4.4 6.8 12.1 5
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columns we present the welfare effects of an immediate sale of all government gold versus a sale in year
20. Total welfare is $105 billion higher with an immediate sale. The gain from reducing the production
inefficiency is smaller than in the other two comparisons but represents about the same share (73.8%) of
the total.
Fig. 4 shows the estimated effects on welfare from private uses of the sale of all government gold in
every year t, t=0, . . ., T versus no sale under the reference set of parameters. The gains in total welfare,
government revenue, and depletion users’ welfare and the losses in mine owners’ welfare decline
monotonically with delay. In contrast, the gains in the welfare of service users and the losses in welfare
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Fig. 4. Differences in economic welfare: welfare with sale of all government gold in a given year minus welfare with no sale.
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D.W. Henderson et al. / Review of Financial Economics 16 (2007) 235–258252assumption that the demand schedules shift outward over time because of population growth, postponing
a government sale has both positive and negative effects on the welfare of the two types of agents if it
occurs during the original mining phase. The postponement of a government sale reduces the present
value of the capital loss per unit suffered by owners of the service stock. However, in the presence of
population growth, a delay in the sale means that the capital loss per unit is imposed on larger holdings
since {At*} is increasing.
4.2.3. Sensitivity analysis
Now we investigate the sensitivity of the simulated price and welfare effects of different government
policies to changes in some key parameters. In particular, we compare these effects under each of four
alternative parameter sets to their effects under the reference set. The comparison of welfare results is
reported in the four panels at the bottom of Table 2. For each alternative parameter set, differences in
welfare changes from those in the reference case for a given policy comparison are reported as
percentages of the total welfare change for that policy comparison under the reference set (top left
row). To be concrete, consider the entries in the middle column for the qbqrs parameter set (middle
right). The Table says that, under this alternative parameter set, the change in total welfare resulting
from an immediate sale rather than a sale in year 20 is smaller than the $234 billion increase under the
reference set by 1.6% of $234 billion ($3.74 billion). The change in government revenue is smaller
than the $193 billion increase under the reference set by 1.7% of $234 billion ($3.98 billion). Because
we express each difference as a percent of the same number ($234 billion), the sum of the percentage
differences for the various market participants adds to 1.6% as does the sum for the production and
the use inefficiencies.
An important part of the explanation of the difference in results between the reference set of
parameters and each alternative set is the difference in demand parameters (e, q, a, and b) required to
match the data (P̄=P(q̄, 0) and ic=R(Ā, 0)) in the calibration process. We explain the difference in
demand parameters for each alternative set.
Recall that under the policies involving government lending and postponement of government sales
for as long as possible, the first sale of government gold takes place in the year in which cumulative
depletion exceeds the sum of the initial above-ground and below-ground stocks for the first time under
the assumption that there is an outright sale. As stated above, this year is year 368 for an outright
immediate sale under the reference set. This year is year 358 or later for outright immediate sales under
all the alternative parameter sets considered.
4.2.3.1. H̄N H̄rs. First, we compare the results for the reference set with those for the alternative set with
H̄N H̄rs by 25%. With no sale, for both sets the price starts at P̄ and remains above it for most of the
horizon. With the H̄N H̄rs set, more gold must be depleted over the same horizon, so demand at prices
above P̄ must be higher, and, therefore, e and a must be smaller than in the reference set as shown in
Table 1. Since q=e by assumption, q and b must also be smaller.
With an immediate sale, the price drop is greater (to $267 rather than $275) with the H̄N H̄rs set as is
plausible because depletion demand is more inelastic and the price path must rise more steeply in the
early years because the loan fee is smaller given that q and b are smaller. The differences for total
welfare (Table 2, middle left) and for the production inefficiency versus use inefficiency breakdowns are
not very sensitive to the change in H̄. The results for the market-participant breakdowns for the
immediate sale versus no sale and for a sale in year 20 versus no sale are relatively easy to interpret.
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service stock owners’ and mine owners’ losses are larger. Although the inverse depletion demand and
service demand schedules are steeper, the price and loan fee fall by enough more that depletion users’
and service users’ welfare gains are larger.
4.2.3.2. qbqrs. Next, we compare results for the reference set of parameters with those for the
alternative set with qbqrs. If q is smaller, then b must be smaller if the q, b pair is to imply ic=R(Ā, 0).
The same amount of gold must be depleted over the same horizon with both sets, so it makes sense that
there should be less depletion in early years and more in later years with the qbqrs set. If the inverse
depletion demand function is to be consistent with these changes in the depletion path while continuing
to satisfy P̄=P(q̄, 0), e and a must be larger in the qbqrs set.
With an immediate sale the price drop is slightly larger (to $273 rather than $275) with the qbqrs
set as is plausible because even though depletion demand is more elastic the price path must rise more
steeply in the early years because the loan fee is smaller given that q and b are smaller. Total welfare
gains and production-inefficiency versus use-inefficiency breakdowns (Table 2, middle right) are not
very sensitive to the change in q. The results for the market-participant breakdowns for the immediate
sale versus no sale and for a sale in year 20 versus no sale comparisons are relatively easy to interpret.
The changes in the differences in government revenue and mine owners’ welfare are quite small. The
changes in the welfare differences for depletions users, service stock owners, and service users are
somewhat larger. Depletion users gain less because even though the depletion demand curve is flatter
and the price drops in the first few years are greater, the price drops in later years are smaller. Service
users gain more, and service stock owners’ losses are greater because even though the inverse service
demand curve is steeper, the loan fee falls by enough more in enough of the early years that count
most.
4.2.3.3. cbcrs. Now, we compare results for the reference set of parameters with those for the
alternative set with cbcrs. The change in results is considerably greater for this alternative set than for
the alternative sets with H̄N H̄rs and with qbqrs Since icb icrs, the price path must rise faster with the
cbcrs set as long as the mines are open and with our parameters continues to rise faster for many years
thereafter. The same amount of gold must be depleted with both parameter sets, so demand at prices
above P̄ must be higher and e and a must both be smaller with the cbcrs set as shown in Table 1. Since
q=e by assumption, q and b must also be smaller.
With an immediate sale, the price drop is considerably greater (to $243 rather than $275) with the
cbcrs set as is plausible because depletion demand is more inelastic and the price path must rise more
steeply in the early years because the loan fee is lower given that q and b are smaller. The total welfare
gains (Table 2, bottom left) for an immediate sale versus either of the other two alternatives are
noticeably reduced with a lower c. As might be expected, the gain from reducing or eliminating the
production inefficiency is much less with the cbcrs set. The gain from reducing or eliminating use
inefficiencies is greater for the two comparisons involving no sale. The results for the market-participant
breakdowns for the immediate sale versus no sale and for a sale in year 20 versus no sale are relatively
easy to interpret. The price falls by more with the cbcrs set, so the increase in government revenue is
smaller, the gains of depletion users are larger, and the losses of stock owners and mine owners are
larger. The path of the loan fee is enough lower in the first part of the horizon that counts most that the
gains of service users are greater with the cbcrs set.
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for the alternative set with both H̄N H̄rs and cbcrs. The total welfare gains (Table 2, bottom right panel)
for an immediate sale versus either of the other two alternatives are lower with this alternative set than
with any other parameter set considered, as is plausible because both raising H̄ and lowering c tend to
reduce the total welfare gain for reasons given in the discussion of the H̄N H̄rs and cbcrs sets. The results
for the case with both H̄N H̄rs and cbcrs are roughly the same as the sum of the results for the case with
only H̄N H̄rs and those for the case with only cbcrs. That is, for the range of parameters we consider the
nonlinearities in the model are not very important.
4.2.4. The incentive for a government to be the first to sell
If one government unilaterally sells its gold before other governments can sell or even announce a sale
of their reserves, that government earns a larger discounted revenue than it would if other governments
sold at the same time. For example, Fig. 5 shows what happens if the U.S. unilaterally and immediately
sells all its gold. The gold price drops only $19 per ounce–from $350 to $331–instead of dropping $75 per
ounce–from $350 to $275–as it does if all governments sell at the same time. Since the U.S. gold stock is
262 million troy ounces (Table 1, Panel D)–24% of all government gold–U.S. revenue is about $87 billion
when the U.S. manages to sell before announced sales of the other countries but only about $72 billion
when all gold is sold, a difference of about $15 billion or about 17%.
The extra benefit the U.S. enjoys from its preemptive sale comes not at the expense of the other
governments but instead at the expense of the private agents who purchase U.S. gold. If all of the other
governments hold unanticipated sales on the day following the U.S. sale, the price drops to $275 then.
The other governments are no worse off than if all sales had occurred together on the previous day, but
private purchasers of U.S. gold each sustain a capital loss of $56 per ounce the moment the other
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Fig. 5. Predicted paths for real gold price under alternative assumptions about government gold sales.
D.W. Henderson et al. / Review of Financial Economics 16 (2007) 235–258 255If the announcement of a U.S. sale raises the market’s probability assessment that the other
governments will sell soon, the U.S. gain from a preemptive sale is reduced, to zero in the limiting case.
The increased probability of further sales would cause the price to fall below $331 at the time of the U.S.
sale, to $275 in the limiting case in which the market regards sales of all gold by other governments as
certain to follow the U.S. sale.
In September 1999, European governments announced an agreement to limit their gold sales and
lending for the next five years.17 Their announcement was followed by a significant rise in the gold
price. This sequence of events is consistent with the view that over the several years preceding actual or
announced sales by Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom and increased gold
lending had caused the market to revise upward its probability assessment of further sales and lending
and that the agreement caused the market to revise downward its assessment.5. Conclusions
In our previous paper on government gold sales (Salant & Henderson, 1978), we showed that the risk
of sales not only depressed the gold price but led it to rise by more than the rate of interest. At the outset
of that earlier work (p. 630), we explicitly abstracted from two prominent characteristics of the gold
market: the service flow generated by gold jewelry (and art objects) and the high extraction cost of gold.
We did so since neither characteristic was responsible for the phenomenon we sought to illuminate.
In this paper, our goal is different. We quantify the huge welfare losses caused by the continued
postponement of government sales and determine the distribution of those losses among groups of
market participants. Delayed government sales (1) deprive service users of available gold (one of two
use inefficiencies) and (2) force the private sector to rely on a source of supply with higher extraction
costs (the production inefficiency). Since service flows and extraction costs are central to the efficiency
loss, ignoring them is no longer possible. To make our analysis accessible, we simplify elsewhere. Since
the private market had, until the last decade, seemingly been lulled into giving little weight to the
possibility of substantial government sales, we ignore the uncertainty central to our previous paper—
taking pains to calibrate our model using data from this earlier period when the risk of government sales
seemed small.18
Welfare from private uses is maximized by making all the gold currently held by governments
immediately available to private agents who value its depletion and service uses. As our simulation
results show, postponing government gold sales another 20 years fritters away $105 billion or roughly
one-third of the potential gain. The losses from delay are not evenly distributed among the various17 For the texts of the September 1999 Washington Agreement and the more recent September 2004 agreement, see World
Gold Council (2005).
18 Readers interested in understanding how the two analyses fit together are referred to Appendix B. Other assumptions could
also usefully be relaxed if realism was preferred to simplicity. It would probably be relatively easy to relax our assumptions that
every deposit of gold has the same marginal cost of extraction and that this common marginal cost of extraction is invariant to
the amount extracted in a year. It would also probably be relatively easy to relax our assumption that once a unit of gold has
been taken from belowground it can be depleted or added to the service stock without incurring any dadjustmentT costs. A
crucial building block for an extension to the case of adjustment costs is provided by Flood and Garber (1984) who posit rising
marginal costs of adjustment for transforming units of aboveground gold into units of service stock.
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billion by delaying their sales another 20 years. The remaining $1 billion are lost directly by the private
market. In the simulations, depletion users always gain and mine owners always lose. However, service
users and private above-ground stock owners may gain or lose under our assumption that population is
growing.
In our analysis, government gold ownership does not have any direct benefits. There is a view that it
does for at least three reasons: (1) gold reserves would be necessary if gold ever again played an
important role in international monetary arrangements; (2) gold is an important part of a bwar chestQ for
times of international crisis; and (3) gold is irreplaceable in certain strategic uses. To the extent that there
is some truth to this view, it suggests that governments might prefer gold loans to gold sales.
Any benefits of government ownership of gold are lost at once with an immediate sale of all
government gold. However, any such benefits are lost much later with the equivalent policy of
immediate lending of all remaining government gold and gradual sales of government gold beginning
after a delay of some years. It is clear that if governments lent out all their gold but wanted to keep
open the possibility of using it in a crisis, they would have to structure loan contracts so that they could
get their gold back immediately in a crisis. Difficulties might arise in incorporating the necessary
provisions into loan contracts. In addition, costs would be incurred in administering gold loans and
gradual gold sales. However, these difficulties and costs might well be small enough that it would still
be worthwhile for governments to make most or all of their gold available for private uses immediately
through gold loans.
In any event, the importance of gold as a possible future reserve asset, as part of a war chest, and as a
strategic material has clearly diminished in recent years and will, in all likelihood, continue to diminish.
Our analysis reveals just how large the benefits from government gold ownership would have to be for
the policy of massive government stockpiling to be justified.Appendix A
In this appendix we explain how some of the values in Table 1 are obtained. We represent the name
bGold Field Mineral Services Ltd.Q as bGFMSQ.
A weighted average of cash costs in the different producing countries for 1992 as reported in, GFMS
(1993) is $300 per troy ounce. However, we chose $250 per troy ounce as our reference value for c,
partly because of the suggestions of several gold market analysts. The value for Ā is constructed using
data from GFMS (1993) and GFMS (1996). Fig. 30 on p.32 of GFMS (1993) contains an estimate of
total production through the end of 1992 (121,500 metric tons). Following Sehnke (1997), we assume
that the total stock still available at the end of 1992 was only 0.85 times this amount. To obtain our
estimate of the private stock at the end of 1992, we deduct the estimate of government stocks as of the
end of 1991 (35,556 metric tons) in Table 1on p. 11 of O’Callaghan (1993), which was the only estimate
we found for a time near the end of 1992 which included the holdings of the government of the former
Soviet Union. In the text of p. 32, GFMS (1993) provides an estimate of the amount of gold in jewelry at
the end of 1992 (baroundQ 50,000 metric tons). We adopt this estimate and assume that the gold in
medals, coins, bars, and physical investment at the end of 1992 was equal to our estimate of the total
private stock minus the amount in jewelry. To obtain our estimate of Ā at the end of 1995, we add
estimates of the increases for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 of gold in jewelry from Table 5 on p. 45,
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GFMS (1996) and of gold in physical investment from the text on p. 62 in GFMS (1994), on p. 61 in
GFMS (1995), and on p. 61 in GFMS (1996) and convert the result to troy ounces using the conversion
factor 32,150.7 troy ounces permetric ton.
Estimating the path of world population for many years in the future is a very difficult task. Several
methods of estimation are considered in Cohen (1995). Our assumption that cq=cA=0.96, which implies
that world population levels off at twice its current value by about 2050, is consistent with one of these
methods.
Our estimate is the sum of the individual items (71,300 metric tons), not the rounded total, for the end
of 1996 in the column labeled bReserve BaseQ in Sehnke (1996) times the conversion factor of 32,150.7
troy ounces per metric ton. The comparable figure for the end of 1995 (60,800 metric tons) in Sehnke
(1996) is 15% smaller primarily because of a change in the estimate for South Africa.
The value of P̄ is a round number close to an average of market prices for the first half of 1997. The value
of q̄ is an average of depletion uses for the years 1993, 1994, and 1995 as reported in GFMS (1996).
The values for Ḡ and U.S. gold are the holdings of all governments and international institutions and
the holdings of the U.S. government as of the end of November 1996 as reported in International
Monetary Fund (1996).Appendix B
In this appendix, we outline a modified version of the model. In this modified version, private agents
anticipate each period that a sale of Ḡ will occur with probability a given that no sale has occurred
already as in Salant and Henderson (1978). As a consequence, the two recursions are different, but they
reduce to the recursions of the text when a=0.
The loan recursion, the counterpart to Eq. (9), becomes
Pt  I 1 að ÞPtþ1 þ af Atþ1 þ Ḡ;Htþ1; t þ 1ð Þ½  ¼ IR Atþ1; t þ 1ð Þ:
This recursion must hold at every year t=0, . . ., T1. f(xt, yt, t) is the price immediately following a
government sale at t if the augmented above-ground stock is xt and the below-ground stock is yt. It could
be calculated and stored numerically by simulating our model from alternative initial conditions,
beginning in year t +1. For someone to hold gold above ground, he would have to earn as much selling
one unit today and banking the proceeds as he would by renting out that unit for the year and then
receiving the probability-weighted average of (1) Pt+1 in the absence of a government sale or (2)
f(At+1+ Ḡ, Ht+1, t+1) following a government sale at t+1.
The mining recursion, the counterpart to Eq. (12), becomes
I 1 að Þ Ptþ1  cð Þ þ aj Atþ1 þ Ḡ;Htþ1; t þ 1ð Þ½  ¼ Pt  c;
which, after simplification, can be written in more familiar form as
Pt ¼ I 1 að ÞPtþ1 þ aj Atþ1 þ Ḡ;Htþ1; t þ 1ð Þ þ c aþ ið Þ½ :
This recursion holds in the interior of the mining phase. Prior to that phase, the left-hand side will be
larger; subsequent to it, the left-hand side will be smaller. j(xt, yt, t) is the shadow price immediately
D.W. Henderson et al. / Review of Financial Economics 16 (2007) 235–258258following the government sale at t+1 if the augmented above-ground stock is xt and the below-ground
stock is yt. This function could be calculated and stored numerically by simulating our model from
alternative initial conditions beginning in year t+1. For someone to extract at t he would have to earn as
much extracting and selling one unit at t as he would expect to earn (1) extracting and selling at t+1 in
the absence of a government sale or (2) extracting after the resumption of mining following a
government sale at t +1.
All of the other equations are the same in the modified model. In particular, the initial conditions (7)
and (10), terminal conditions (8) and (11), and transition equations (Ht+1 =Htht and
At+1=At+htq(Pt)) are the same.
For sufficiently small a, the results would approximate the results of the simulations we have
reported. For larger values of a, the qualitative conclusions would be the same but the quantitative
conclusions would be different. The higher a, the smaller the gain in expected total welfare that would
result from making government gold available. On the other hand, if a government sale is anticipated to
occur with high probability but does not occur, there is a welfare loss.References
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